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Black Church Politics
and the
Million Man March
by William E. Nelson, Jr.
October 16, 1995 will be recorded as one of the most
important days in the political history of African
Americans in the United States. This day witnessed the
largest mass political demonstration in the history of this
nation—the assemblage of more than 1 .2 million African-
American men in Washington, D.C. under the banner of
the Million Man March. 1 Both the size and the overt
political objectives of the march set it firmly apart from
the pallid, feeble demonstrations in Washington led by the
NAACP in the 1980s; in its size and character, the march
echoed the focus on power and system level change that
emerged as the hallmark of the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement and the national mobilization against the war
in Vietnam.
One key political objective of the march was to place
the issue of Black suffering back on the national policy
agenda. 2 Since the Republican triumph in the November
1994 midterm elections and the publicizing of the party's
"Contract With America," the continuing and expanding
social and economic crisis of the Black community had
virtually disappeared as an arena of public policy debate.
Republican political rhetoric papered over the most vital
dimensions of the crisis in international capitalism and
blamed Black inner city victims for domestic economic
woes that threatened to produce record deficits, massive
unemployment, and uncontrolled inflation. 3 Absent from
the analysis was a realistic appraisal of Black social and
economic decline: a poverty rate of over 40 percent;
unemployment rates that averaged two times that of
whites; health and housing standards matching those of
city dwellers in some of the world's poorest countries;
median family incomes averaging 58 percent of white
median family incomes. Statistics regarding the social and
economic status of Black men suggested that they were
the special victims of American racial oppression.
Environmental circumstances rendered the lives of young
Black men extremely perilous; homicide had become one
of the leading causes of death among young Black men,
with 72 Black men per 100,000 falling victim to homicide
compared to 9.3 white men per 100,000. 4 Aggressive law
enforcement and prison building policies meant the
incarceration of young Black men in unprecedented
numbers, leaving a vacuum of political and family
leadership that had a devastating impact on the sustained
growth potential of the Black community. 5
The Million Man March was, in part, Black America's
response to these developments. Black men descended on
Washington determined to bring the spiral of social and
economic erosion in the Black community to a halt.
Expressing extreme concern for increasing racism in
America and the deterioration of the social, cultural, and
moral fabric of the Black community, Black men came to
Washington, in the words of the march's mission
statement, "Committed to the ongoing struggle for a free
and empowered community, a just society and a better
world." 6 Defining ingredients of the march's political
agenda included challenges to the government to stop the
brutal assault against affirmative action, establish
programs to provide affordable health care and housing,
and pass legislation creating an economic bill of rights
and a plan to rebuild America's declining cities. 7 One
aspect of this political agenda also sought to repair the
negative, stereotypical image of Black men manufactured
by the American media. Worldwide publicity surrounding
the lives of Black men like Willie Horton, Mike Tyson,
and O.J. Simpson stamped all Black men in America with
a demonized personality, and placed Black men on a war-
like footing with white America:
The emancipation of black men has been
abandoned. The communications with black
men have been cut off, which is what happens
when you're on a war footing with the enemy.
Talks break down and hostility begins. Their
books are seldom used in college courses
anymore. A variety of viewpoints from black
men are ignored by the white male-run media
who prefer athletes and criminals, and other
dopey people and use black and white
feminists to blame all the social evils of society
on black men, while theirs go unchecked. 8
To combat these negative stereotypes, and establish an
enduring base of functional power for the entire Black
community, the leaders of the march realized that the
march must be well organized and coordinated,
extraordinarily peaceful, and sufficiently inclusive to
embrace the entire panoply of political interests in the
Black community. In this regard it should be noted that
the march was successful in drawing representation from
virtually every sector of the Black community. One study
conducted by a research team from Central State
University found that the occupations of the marchers
ranged from business owners to a wide variety of
unskilled workers, paraprofessionals, professionals and
skilled tradesmen. 9 The heavy representation of middle-
class Black men at the march suggests that a broad
reservoir of racial consciousness continues to exist among
this important segment of the Black population. 10
The policy goals of the march contained a pronounced
political slant. Organizers of the march expressed the
desire to see the mass mobilization in Washington result
in highly successful voter education, registration, and
turnout campaigns in cities, towns, and hamlets across
America. Relying heavily on the concepts of Black
nationalism and self-determination, march leaders sought
to establish grassroots networks in local communities
capable of creating permanent bases of functional power
for the Black community in local, state, and national
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political and governmental arenas. Thus, the Million Man
March was viewed as more than a one-day demonstration,
but the pivotal foundation for a wider movement that
would substantially transform the distribution of societal
benefits and the workings of the governmental order."
Strategic Mobilization
No project of the magnitude and ambition of the
Million Man March could possibly succeed without
effective strategic plans for large scale mobilization.
Formal planning for the march began to unfold with the
recognition of Minister Louis Farrakhan, head of the
Nation of Islam, as the leader and guiding spirit of the
march. Minister Farrakhan's assumption of this role, while
controversial, was a logical extension of a political career
that has seen him emerge as one of the best known and
most popular political figures in Black America. Minister
Farrakhan is not a newcomer to the American political
scene. He first rose to prominence as a devout follower of
Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammed, who took the
lead in denouncing Malcolm X as a traitor "worthy of
death" when Malcolm broke from the ranks of the Nation
of Islam to form a new organization, the Muslim Mosque,
Inc.
12 Upon the death of Elijah Muhammed, Farrakhan
emerged as a major victor in a battle waged with Elijah
Muhammed's son, Wallace Deen Muhammed, over the
resources and the political image of the Nation of Islam.
Clinging tightly to the mantel of Elijah Muhammed,
Farrakhan rose to the summit of leadership within the
Nation of Islam and ultimately within Black America as a
whole. A critical step in this journey was the highly visible
role he played in the 1984 Jesse Jackson presidential
campaign. This opened the door of criticism for
association with someone accused of anti-semitism. 13
Despite persistent attacks on Minister Farrakhan by
outside forces, including the white media, his popularity
in the Black community has continued to rise. Minister
Farrakhan's genius has been to recognize, like Marcus
Garvey, the existence of an enduring commitment to
Black nationalism among key sectors of the Black
population, especially the Black poor. Minister Farrakhan
speaks to the hope for deliverance that rests in the souls of
millions of Black people who possess a strong sense of
racial pride and consciousness. In the 1990s, Minister
Farrakhan has emerged as a popular and formidable force
because he evokes in his speeches symbols of defiance
and liberation. Further, he evinces a fighting spirit that
harkens back to the militant politics of Black leaders such
as William Monroe Trotter, Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X,
and Fannie Lou Hamer. Clearly, masses of Blacks are
looking for leaders who are willing to stand up and defend
the interest of the race against the unvarnished attacks
emanating out of Washington. 14 Minister Farrakhan has
demonstrated an uncommon willingness to talk in fighting
terms—to tell it like it is. In doing so, he has appealed to a
broad array of Black citizens across class lines.
The idea of a massive demonstration by Black men in
Washington did not originate with Minister Farrakhan but
was first broached in a speech in Chicago by Reverend
Hycel Taylor ol Iwanston. Illinois and later reinforced by
conversations between Minister Farrakhan and Reverend
James Bevel, a protege of Dr. Martin Luther King during
the heyday of Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC). Eventually this idea crystallized into the concept
of the Million Man March. Minister Farrakhan teamed
with Dr. Benjamin Chavis, former executive director of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and director of the National African
American Leadership Committee, to transform plans for
the march into a program of action. A formal call for the
march was made at a summit meeting of Black leaders in
Washington, D.C. in November 1994. Under the guidance
of Minister Farrakhan, a massive mobilization campaign
was launched by the Nation of Islam. Across the country
Minister Farrakhan began holding huge rallies for Black
men only. The enthusiastic response to the meetings by a
cross-section of the Black male population convinced
Minister Farrakhan that the Million Man March in the
nation's capital was very much within the realm of
possibility.
Minister Farrakhan's efforts alone would not, of
course, be enough to assure the success of the march. The
pivotal key to the march's success would be the
generation of enthusiastic support for the march by
masses of Black men across the country. The process of
grassroots mobilization was promoted at two levels. First,
a National Million Man March Organizing Committee
was formed, composed of representatives of a wide
assortment of national organizations, as well as
community activists and scholars. The heart of the
grassroots mobilization effort was at the local level where
local organizing committees were established in more
than 400 cities. 15
In local communities the drum beat for the march was
carried forth by a host of institutions including
newspapers, radio stations, fraternities and sororities,
professional organizations, colleges and universities,
factories, banks, and hospitals. 16 Although displaying in its
early stages signs of organizational disunity and
ineffectiveness, the grassroots effort was eventually
successful in transforming the campaign for the march
into an emotional crusade. In this regard Reverend Willie
F. Wilson, pastor of the Union Temple Baptist Church of
Washington, D.C. recalled:
I personally felt that there was a need for
less discussion and more doing. Therefore, I
re-organized the men of Union Temple Baptist
Church along with a few men from other
churches, to get out in the streets and sign up
men for the March.
To my utter amazement, there was an
electrifying enthusiasm out in the streets. We
didn't have to prompt, cajole or beg anybody
to sign up. Wives signed up their husbands,
mothers signed up their sons and men joyfully
signed up on their own. We went into barber
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shops, went to street corners, and stood in
malls. Everywhere we went the response was
overwhelming. We signed up over 100,000
men in the Washington metropolitan area! 17
Two programmatic decisions made by the National
Organizing Committee helped to stir enthusiasm for the
march at the local level. First, the project would be billed
not only as a march, but a "Holy Day of Atonement." This
decision meant that the project would move beyond the
articulation of Black grievances to embrace the concept of
spiritual renewal and regeneration. Seeking to create
higher levels of political consciousness in the Black
community, project leaders would ask Black men to
recognize past wrongs and to make amends by making a
new vow of social responsibility and community uplift. 18
Second, the project would become not only a march, but a
"Day of Absence." The objective of this strategy was to
formally incorporate Black women into the project at the
grassroots level by asking them to support the march by
staying away, on the day of the march, from a host of
routine activities including work, school, and the
patronizing of businesses and places of entertainment. 19
Thus, the strategic plan anticipated the building of an
inclusive united front in the Black community in support
of the march. Given the array of diverse political interests
in the Black community, the call for an united front, while
emotionally appealing, was probably unrealistic.
Response of the Black Church
The most potentially damaging Black resistance to the
march took the form of divisions by leaders of important
Black church organizations to express open opposition to
the march. The specter of opposition to the march by the
institutional Black Church constituted a serious threat to
the success of the national mobilization campaign.
Historically, much of the organizational capacity of the
Black community has resided in the influence and
resources of the Black Church. March leaders were
compelled to confront and come to grips with the reality
that "no successful movement for improving the
conditions of life for the African-American people has
been mounted without the support of the church." 20 The
church's control over the emotions, behavior, preferences,
and resources of its members provides it with a
formidable advantage over its political rivals in the Black
community.
In this regard, it should be noted that Black churches
played central roles in the organization and
implementation of programmatic objectives during the
civil rights campaigns of the 1960s. 21 Black churches have
engaged in a range of activities designed to strengthen the
position of the Black community in the political process,
including the organization of ministerial alliances, the
publication and distribution of election documents, and
the selection and grooming of candidates for public office,
the establishment of political action committees, the
coordination and management of voter registration, and
public lobbying on a variety of social, economic, and
cultural issues. 22 Collectively, Black churches represent an
unrivaled structure of power in the Black community.
Candidates for public office clearly recognize that any
effort to mobilize mass support in the Black community
must begin with the cultivation of strong support from
individual Black ministers and religious institutions, both
separately and collectively.
Collectively, Black churches represent an
unrivaled structure ofpower in the Black
community.
The religious foundations of the march were broad and
deep, representing incredible support from the Muslim
community and strong support from a mosaic of Black
Christian organizations. Opposition from within the ranks
of the Black Church, however, was also significant.
Several nationally prominent Black ministers publicly
refused to endorse the march. Local organizers reported
stiff opposition from a rich variety of influential Black
ministers. Many ministers argued that they were
compelled to oppose the march because of irreconcilable
theological differences with Minister Farrakhan. They
believed that they could not, as Christian ministers,
endorse a march led by a minister of the Islamic faith. 23
Many ministers also agreed with the statements of
Black politicians who said they could not support
Minister Farrakhan because he preached a gospel of racial
hatred and social conflict. They were especially disturbed
by this minister's support for Khallid Abdul Muhammed,
a Nation of Islam national spokesman, who persistently
denounced Jews in strident terms, as well as by reports
that Minister Farrakhan had referred to Judaism as a dirty
religion and Jews as bloodsuckers.
Some ministers opposed the march on political rather
than theological grounds. Storm clouds have prevailed for
more than a decade around the alleged invasion of
Muslims into arenas formerly dominated and controlled
exclusively by Black churches. Government contracts to
Muslims to wage war on drugs or to provide security for
housing projects have been met with resentment and
protests from Black Christian ministers and their
followers. Traditionally, Black churches have been the
recipients of government largess as well as patronage
from local political organizations. 24 The emergence of the
Muslims as a strong political force threatened to weaken
the stream of government benefits to Black churches and
to shatter relations with external forces forged through
years of strategic political interaction. Organizing
activities around the Million Man March was viewed by
some as an extension of the Muslim program of invasion
and political dilution. If the grassroots goals of the march
were realized, control over community resources would
become more decentralized, further undermining the
effective control over such resources by Black churches.
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Opposition by some Black ministers was spawned
principally by their view that support for the march would
be interpreted as support for a militant campaign
antithetical to the interests of their white allies. This was
the prevailing view among conservative Black ministers
who took great pride in the roles they played as racial
diplomats. One respondent explained the opposition to the
march by this element of Black ministerial leadership in
the following manner:
After 500 years of Negroness it is hard for
them to stand on their own feet. They want to
make Farrakhan a devil because the white man
says he's a devil. If I start to upset the white
man, he is going to upset me. They did not
want to upset Newt Gingrich and his boys. Too
many are Negroes; they did what they believed
their white benefactors wanted them to do. We
must expose them for what they are. They are
not representing the Black community. They
are preaching their own form of self-hate.
They practice a form of feel good religion. It is
all about preaching and having a good time.
They are afraid of white people so they won't
tell their members that our liberation can't be
from the top down but must come from the
bottom up. 25
Reverend Willie Wilson's efforts to garner cooperation
from Black ministers in Washington, D.C. revealed, in
dramatic terms, the political and emotional insecurity of
Black ministers who consider themselves trapped in the
racial divide:
I made a request to the largest Christian
ministers' conference in Washington, D.C. to
allow Minister Louis Farrakhan to speak to the
several hundred pastors affiliated with that
body to share the vision of the Million Man
March.
Needless to say, the ministers were so
impressed with Minister Farrakhan's grip on
Christian scriptures that they overwhelmingly
voted to support the march. However, two
weeks later, the Conference President
explained their backpedaling this way: "Y'all
don't want to say it, but we are scared!! I'm
from down deep South and I know what white
people will do to you. White people will kill
you!! We are afraid of white folks! That's why
we don't want to march."26
There is evidence to support the proposition that
opposition to the march by some Black church forces
emanated, in some measure, from the internal politics of
national Black church organizations. The refusal on the
part of Dr. Henry Lyons, President of the National Baptist
Convention, USA, with 8.7 million members, to endorse
the march was a product of the bruising battle he had to
endure to win the president of this massive and powerful
religious organization. Lyons came to power in lw-4 on
the heels of a major controversy surrounding the
retirement from the presidency <>t Reverend T. J. Jemison.
Jemison had threatened to run for another term despite
provisions in the Convention by-laws that limited the
presidency to a maximum of 10 sears the number ol
years he had already served. Jemison reluctantly Stepped
aside, naming as his heir apparent F. W. Richardson of
New York. The election for the presidency, held in New
Orleans in 1993, was hotly contested. Lyons announced
his opposition to Richardson along with William Shaw
from Pennsylvania and C.A. Clark from Texas. A major
dispute emerged over whether or not voting would be by
secret ballot. Additional wrangling surfaced over the issue
of the supervision of the election by New Orleans election
officials. When these issues were resolved, the balloting
was held; the final results showed Lyons winning by
1,000 votes. The Jemison and Richardson forces refused
to accept the outcome, charging in a legal suit that the
election was rigged. Although the suit was resolved in
Lyons' favor, the legal action delayed his formal
installation as president by several months.
Lyons moved into the presidency in December 1993
determined to extricate himself from the shadow of
controversy and to establish his position as a strong
independent leader. It was in this context that he
announced his position on a number of issues, including
the Million Man March, and set forward a new
operational agenda. One of his first actions at the 1994
Convention in Birmingham was to announce his
opposition to the Million Man March. This decision was
made principally on the basis of Lyons' need to
demonstrate leadership and establish a functional power
base within his organization. In retrospect, some of
Lyons' supporters believed that his failure to endorse the
march was a tactical blunder: "He probably should have
said nothing. It is difficult to become president of 8
million people. He exercised poor judgment on this issue
and damaged his relations with the progressive wing of
the Convention."27
Lyons has sought to overcome the controversy
surrounding his decision on the march by moving
aggressively to implement his own community action
agenda. As an answer to the Million Man March, he
organized a march in Atlanta, Georgia. The march was
held in November 1995. Approximately 5,000 people are
reported to have attended. 28 Lyons' most important
community outreach initiative has been the Trusted
Partners Program. This was an idea originally included in
the campaign literature of Cleo McConnell running for
president of the National Laymen's Movement of the
National Baptist Convention, USA. Essentially, Trusted
Partners is a program designed to get Black Christian men
involved in the process of bringing young Black boys to
manhood. Through a series of seminars, one-on-one
counseling sessions, and planned activities such as field
trips, Baptist laymen are given an opportunity to establish
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close personal relations with young Black men at a crucial
turning point in their lives. The central objective is to
provide alternatives for young Black men to the urban
street culture, alternatives that will motivate them to stay
in school and build for themselves stable, productive
patterns of development in the broader society. 29 Although
Lyons is aware that this program may overlap with some
of the youth programs in the Black community already in
place, he is convinced that the Black Church is in a better
position to accomplish the goals of Trusted Partners than
any other community institution.
Conclusion
The Million Man March was, in many ways, a
watershed event in the political history of African
Americans. Its crowning accomplishment was the
bringing together of more than one million Black men in a
spirit of peace, unity, reconciliation, atonement and
renewal. The symbolism of one million Black Men
massed in Washington conveyed to the world a number of
critical messages:
That in 1995 Black America would not allow
white America to choose and sanction its
leaders.
That Black people had sufficient leadership
skill and logistical capability to pull off a
march of unprecedented size and complexity.
That millions of Black men are politically
conscious and politically astute.
That all Black men are not thugs, hoodlums,
and criminals.
That Black people are capable offinancing
their own liberation struggles.
That special bonds offellowships existed
between Black men across class and
ideological lines.
That Black people are not prepared to accept
the consequences ot the Republican Revolution
or the Democratic Party's abandonment to
social justice, without a militant response.
The negative response of some elements of Black church
leadership to the march sheds penetrating light on the
continuing existence of decisive tendencies in the internal
political environment of the Black community. These
tendencies serve notice that much work remains to be
done if the spirit of the Million Man March is to be
transformed into an effective program of action in the
service of African liberation.
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